MacroPolis

President Tayyip Erdogan’s 25 September meeting with President Donald Trump arrives at a sensitive juncture, with Ankara deepening its clampdown on dissent while seeking external wins abroad.

The White House is preparing to showcase major defense and commercial deals, but the underlying dynamic is one of transactional diplomacy set against deep structural tensions.

Crucially, Trump is unlikely to comment on Turkey’s intensifying domestic repression, underscoring the degree to which personal rapport and deal-making have replaced governance concerns as the foundation of bilateral ties.

Defense: F-16s decisive, F-35s remote

The most tangible outcome is expected to be progress on the USD 23bn F-16 package. Ankara has already pared back US upgrade kits in favor of local solutions, but the new aircraft and modernization deals remain vital to Turkey’s air force. The meeting is expected to signal progress on the package and related cooperation. Both leaders are invested in presenting this as a win: Erdogan to demonstrate continued access to Western technology, Trump to tout US defense exports.

By contrast, talk of Turkey’s return to the F-35 program is unlikely to go beyond optics. Ankara was ejected from the program in 2019 after purchasing Russian S-400 systems, and the political, technical, and US legislative barriers remain formidable. Even if Trump signals openness, this will be symbolic. Without verifiable steps to neutralize or remove the S-400s, re-entry is effectively blocked. US congressional approval would also be required, and Turkey’s ties with Hamas complicate the prospects of securing support.

Energy: LNG deals vs. Russian dependence

Energy will be another headline. Turkey is expected to commit to new purchases of US liquefied natural gas, giving Trump an export success story. Yet Turkey remains one of the world’s largest importers of Russian crude and a critical transit route for Russian pipeline gas into Europe. In 2024, Russia retained its status as Turkey’s primary supplier of natural gas, oil, oil products, and coal, continuing the trend established the previous year. This duality illustrates Ankara’s balancing strategy: deepening commercial ties with Washington while preserving energy links with Moscow. The White House is likely to present LNG contracts as a strategic gain, but the underlying reality is that Russia remains Ankara’s dominant energy supplier.

Trade and commercial deals

Beyond defense and energy, trade will feature prominently. Turkish Airlines is expected to finalize a purchase of more than 200 Boeing aircraft. Trump will highlight these deals as proof of narrowing the US trade deficit, while Erdogan leverages them for political capital at home. The longstanding goal of lifting bilateral trade to USD 100bn remains unrealistic, but high-profile contracts allow both leaders to claim progress.

On 22 September, Erdogan lifted the additional import duties on US products imposed since 2018, a conciliatory move aimed at sweetening the atmosphere ahead of his meeting with Trump this week.

Syria: Policy realignment and Turkish red lines

Syria remains a complicated issue: it is critical for Erdogan, who will press for quick action, while Washington is likely to remain more cautious. The US’s recent dismissal of its diplomats working at the Syria mission in Istanbul signals a possible move toward stronger support for Syrian territorial unity under President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Washington is pressuring its Kurdish-led ally Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to implement a March 2025 deal, bringing their territories under Damascus’ authority and integrating fighters into national security forces.

This aligns with Ankara’s demand that PKK-linked structures like the SDF be dissolved, but Turkey doubts the Kurdish group will comply. Turkish officials have signaled “strategic patience,” while warning that military action against the SDF is imminent if integration stalls. For Erdogan, the meeting is a chance to push Trump to lean harder on the SDF, but the risk of divergence remains high – especially given Israel’s assertive military actions in Syria.

Gaza and Israel: Unbridgeable divide

The war in Gaza will cast a shadow over the summit. Erdogan has rejected Trump’s plan to resettle Palestinians outside Gaza and redevelop the territory, describing Israel’s assault as genocide. Trump, closely aligned with Israel, is unlikely to engage Erdogan’s rhetoric or adopt Ankara’s position. Turkey’s ties with Hamas – which Ankara defends as political engagement but Washington regards with suspicion – add another layer of tension. The issue will remain a structural clash that no amount of transactional bargaining can resolve, though both leaders are likely to downplay the divergence in public.

Underscoring this rift, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli, a key ally of Erdogan, last week called for the creation of a Turkey–Russia–China alliance to counter what he described as an “evil coalition” led by the US and Israel. He framed the proposal as the “most suitable option” for the region, presenting it as a direct response to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.

Domestic context: Silence on repression

The Erdogan–Trump meeting comes as Turkey’s ruling party escalates its legal crackdown on the opposition CHP, detaining hundreds of members, ousting elected mayors, and targeting party leaders with investigations. International observers view these measures as politically motivated, yet Ankara’s partners have responded with notable restraint. In Washington, there will be no criticism of Turkey’s democratic backsliding. Instead, President Trump – who has previously praised Erdogan as “smart” and expressed admiration for his leadership – is expected to frame the bilateral agenda almost entirely around defense sales, trade, and energy cooperation.

A transactional meeting in a transactional relationship

The Erdogan–Trump summit is best understood as a transactional encounter. The F-16 package will likely be finalized, LNG contracts announced, and the Boeing order highlighted as a commercial success. By contrast, the F-35 remains blocked, Syria policy remains fraught, and Gaza represents an irreconcilable divide. For Erdogan, the optics of a White House meeting are valuable domestically, given his declining popularity; for Trump, the deals offer export wins. What is absent – and will remain absent – is any concern for the erosion of democracy and the rule of law.

*Wolfango Piccoli is the Co-President of Political Risk Advisory at Teneo.