Competing claims and narratives in Eastern Mediterranean
Greece's post-lockdown hubris
Episode 10 - Get with the (first) programme
Episode 9 - Greek economy toiling under pandemic pressure
VIDEO - How could Greece put the EU recovery fund to best use?
Episode 8 - Athens: An ancient city grappling with modern problems
Divided we fall?
Almost 11 years ago today, tens of thousands of Greeks poured onto the streets in harmonious celebration of the national team's Euro 2004 victory. That was another decade, another time, another world. Today, Greeks have little to celebrate and much that divides them.
Sunday’s referendum delivered a clear and resounding win to the “No” camp (61.3 percent vs 38.7) but it gives the misleading impression that Greeks are strongly united about the way forward. Let’s not forget that the question in the referendum was whether to accept or reject a proposal that contained billions of new austerity measures. This forced thousands of Greeks to vote in favour of spending cuts and tax hikes that they did not want but which they felt were the only way of safeguarding euro membership and a stable future.
To put them in this position was unfair of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. To his credit, Tsipras stressed the need of unity in his speech after the referendum but divisiveness in Greece has been building for the last few years and it will take much more to heal the scars, especially after Sunday’s vote. The positive feeling from expressing exasperation with the policies being proposed by Greece's creditors can dissipate very quickly, as Cypriots discovered a couple of years ago.
As we now know, what we experienced in 2004 (including the magical positivity of the Olympic Games) was ephemeral. In fact, it was symptomatic of Greece's weakness: The sense of rapid progress on the surface, while the structure beneath rotted away.
The failure to address this contradiction was one of the key causes of the Greek crisis, which triggered the bailout programmes. The insistence of many Greeks to see things differently was the main driver behind the growing division in our society. From 2010, the country started to split into the pro- and anti-memorandum camps: There were those who felt only the fiscal belt-tightening and structural reforms recommended by the lenders could put Greece on a path to recovery, while the opposite camp insisted that Greeks were being unfairly punished for sins they did not commit.
The tragedy in all this was that both sides were correct to a large extent. Instead, though, some domestic politicians invested heavily in this rift. Outgoing New Democracy leader Antonis Samaras became the arch-proponent of the anti-memorandum line, feeding the populism that saw George Papandreou's PASOK government as having sold out to the International Monetary Fund and other lenders. This rabid rhetoric is what gave birth to Independent Greeks, who became SYRIZA's coalition partner in January.
Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras was another who built his career and SYRIZA's rise from an insignificant party of protest to one of government on the back of dissatisfaction with the turmoil caused by the drastic adjustment programme.
The dissemination of myths about the crisis and its causes, as well as the social dislocation it caused, also provided fertile ground for the Neo-Nazis of Golden Dawn. The seeds of division were sown.
However, as the programme progressed and Samaras jumped from being an anti-austerity crusader to a bailout enforcer in late 2011, so the dividing lines in Greek society started to blur. In June 2012, when Samaras became prime minister, his coalition government was backed by Democratic Left, which was founded by SYRIZA defectors, making it even more difficult to pinpoint the source of disjuncture.
Still, though, the country's decision makers fed antagonism. Samaras's New Democracy cultivated the "theory of the two extremes," which saw SYRIZA as Golden Dawn's ideological opposite and an equal threat to Greece's stability. Greece's liberals abandoned any attempt to ensure Samaras's government remained socially and economically progressive, and chose instead to focus their fire on SYRIZA.
Tsipras, meanwhile, continued to spin his tale of populist simplicity about the ease with which the crisis could be tackled despite the eurozone's economic dogmatism and political arteriosclerosis, on which previous Greek government's foundered.
In fact, throughout the last five years the lenders have never failed to join Greece in this dance of rupture. From the start of the crisis, when European leaders shied away from giving their voters the full picture (undercapitalised eurozone banks et al) about why the Greek bailout was needed to the constant speculation about whether Greece deserved to stay in the eurozone, their decision-making has been marked by cowardice.
Just as Greek leaders fed separation within their own society for their short-term gains, so their European counterparts were willing to make an example of Greece that could be cast aside at any time to satisfy their own domestic goals. Greek prime ministers and governments came and went like ferries arriving and departing from Piraeus over the last five years but never did Greece's lenders stop to think whether they were helping to undermine political stability in the country they were meant to be assisting. As the unemployment rate, poverty levels and a myriad of other social indicators worsened dramatically, creditors acted as if growing dissatisfaction and vanishing trust were annoying side effects of the programme rather than developments that fundamentally undermined it.
That is, in brief, how we have arrived at this point, with a Greek government that has convinced itself that its homespun fables will come true even though reality has consistently disproved them over the last six months and with European lenders unwilling to deviate from a policy path that had obliterated the Greek political system and left society teetering on the edge.
The massive collective failure on all sides means that Greeks went to vote on Sunday driven by almost exclusively by negative emotions. The "Yes" camp was motivated by its fear that things could get much worse, while the "No" voters were spurred on by their anger at their worsening lot in life. These are two groups that share much in common: Fatigue, fear, uncertainty and distrust but nothing unites them. In fact, the "Yes" voters believe the "No" supporters are risking the country's collapse, while the "No" camp accuses "Yes" of lacking the courage to stand up to lenders.
This is now the new dividing line in Greek society. It will grow into a true fault-line if the efforts of the Greek government to keep the country in the euro fail over the next few days. The onus is now on leaders in Greece and the eurozone to lift the negativity and heal the division they have caused.
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Every nation has its share of not so bright folk. In Greece such share is manifested by the Yes vote camp. This is so because the entire taxation and financial burden of the forthcoming hefty new agreement would fall squarely into their shoulders. It is quite obvious – even for the casual observer – that the Syriza folk (lower economic class) has nothing more to give. It’s even more obvious that the Yes vote camp (wealthier class) would pay dearly 100% of all costs entailed in realizing their foolish wish. I hope this brief explanation also demonstrates how eurozone membership makes average people stupider than they already are. Enjoy the fruits of you labor Yes people because you are paying for the whole new misery fest you just invited upon yourselves :).
The great news of course is that Schauble not only lost considerable morale ground(aka great defeat) in this latest episode but he is about to steamroll all the collaborators who worked with him over the years (thus becoming the true enemies of Greece).
Thank you Schauble, you are a true genius. Your Greek sympathizers will remember you for years and so will we of course since you decided to get down to your knees and do all the required cleaning work yourself thus relieving us from this unpleasant task.
I wonder why the author does not yet dare to tell the full truth. It will no longer be possible to keep that cake intact while eating it:
Either Greece surrenders to efficient reforms of almost everything (I do not think this is possible) or again becomes self determined (after Grexit).
Both cases will be worse than the present, but Grexit has a chance for better future.